In their article on faceless interaction, Janlert and Stolterman (2014) offer us an examination of a foundational concept in interaction design that is both generative in the conversations that it provokes and surprising for the fact that such examinations are not undertaken more often (although Jonathan Grudin's, 1993, article, "Interface: An Evolving Concept," should be noted as an early elaboration of related ideas).
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Their examination is driven primarily by a need for conceptual foundations, rather than an empirical effort to grapple with new interaction modalities, although of course the rise of surface-based interactive devices, the increasing use of speech and free-form gestural technologies, and the decentered interactional style of ubiquitous computing all point toward a need to recognize the importance of what they usefully term "faceless interaction." The result is a genuinely novel approach that does more than simply set the stage for a new model of interaction; it also provides a critical perspective on the history of human-computer interaction (HCI). Although the specific details of faceless interaction set some important new directions for HCI, I want to focus here on the way that the article illuminates what they call the "thought styles" of HCI, adopting the term from the sociologist Ludwik Fleck (1935) .
In setting out the four thought styles that they argue characterize different approaches to HCI, Janlert and Stolerman note a fifth, that of "a channel of communication, that is, an opening or conduit through which 'stuff' passes," although they choose, rather than identifying it as a style in its own right, to treat it as a character common to the other styles, and hence not to treat it in much depth itself. I am inclined to agree with their assessment that this approach is indeed a common foundational element for many of the ways that the concept of interface has been treated, but to my mind this makes it all the more important that we scrutinize it closely rather than brushing it to one side as Janlert and Stolterman do. I believe that the identification of this fifth thought style, incorporated as it is into the others, is a particularly important contribution that this article makes.
Linguist Michael Reddy (1979) coined the term "the conduit metaphor" to refer to a dominant folk theory of linguistic interaction in which language in general, and linguistic expression in particular, is conceptualized as a conduit or pipeline through which ideas pass on their way from one person's mind to another's. In a style familiar to anyone who's read Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) classic Metaphors We Live By, Reddy detailed a large number of common metaphorical expressions that speak to the pervasiveness of this metaphor of communication: consider "He had to struggle to get his ideas across," "Sara wanted to get her ideas down on paper," "Let me try to state your idea in different words," or "His words didn't carry much meaning." As Janlert and Stolterman suggest, this same metaphor pervades much of how we think about interfaces in HCI (and, often, communication in computer-supported cooperative work).
The conduit metaphor is a dominant one, and one thoroughly engrained in our speech, but, as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) noted, "philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (part 1, section 109). Just because we talk about something doesn't make it real. The conduit metaphor distracts us from many of the important features of language as something that we do together, something that doesn't exchange meaning but makes meaning, something that isn't individual action but is conjoined action. We might contrast the conduit metaphor, then, to an alternative model of that would characterize communication as a form of collective social action. This perspective sees the creation of meaning as a collective act, one that arises when people engage together, so that meaning is not embedded in the words but rather emerges from the engagement. It places an emphasis upon social context, on concerted action, and on embodied interaction rather than on linguistic (or other) representations. From this perspective, language is something that people do together. This is a model of language and social action familiar from, for example, Wittgenstein's later writings-and one quite opposed to many ideas (e.g., media richness theory) that sometimes make their way into HCI.
If the conduit metaphor undergirds so many of the thought styles of contemporary HCI, what kind of HCI might result from taking on this alternative? Well, it might be an HCI in which we have a basis for thinking about interactive systems and interfaces themselves as objects that are defined as much by their cultural properties as their technical properties. What it means for something to be "interactive" in this sense is not just a set of technical features but also that it is bound up in a world of technical progressivism, commercial innovation, "disruption," and giddy futurism. ("It's not just a textbook-it's interactive!"). This account of HCI directs our attention to the cultural contexts of encounters between people that they frame as a part of what we need to understand. Indeed, I'd argue that much of what is sometimes labeled as "Third Wave HCI" might be embraced by such an approach. I believe too that the "faceless interaction" model that Janlert and Stolterman discuss-one focused primarily on expressivity and meaning-is also part of what might emerge here. It is a thought style that emphasizes the social and cultural embeddedness of interaction design and of interaction in general, and one that suggests that we must cast our net widely in the 542 Dourish effort to understand what interaction is and means for people as an aspect of the ways that they live and work.
With what consequence, one might ask? Here again I think Janlert and Stolterman point the way toward an answer even if they don't fully explore it yet. The answer lies in the alternative to the interface. If interaction is faceless in their alternative thought style, then what is the site of interaction? It lies not in the computer but in the world, and not on the screen but in our social engagements mediated by technologies of all sorts. These engagements are not simply in how we talk with each other or work with each other, but how our actions are themselves both rooted in and encounters with culture, history, and accreted practice. So, Janlert and Stolerman's analysis works on multiple levels; thought style is not just a characteristic of HCI's research program, it's also a characteristic of the technological encounter.
This inspires a second thought on questions of disciplinary foundation, and we might find the sources of it within the very ideas that inspire Janlert and Stolterman in the first pace. Ludwik Fleck is one of the earliest sociologists of science, and it is perhaps useful to connect his notion of "thought style" that is explored in this paper with a related notion from more recent science studies, Knorr Cetina's (1999) concept of "epistemic cultures." Knorr Cetina's influential book on epistemic cultures looks at two different domains of scientific inquiry, molecular biology and high energy physics, to detail the different ways in which they assess evidence, formulate hypotheses, develop and apply theories, collaborate around problems and data, and engage in collective practices of knowledge creation. Her point is not simply that there are differences but that these styles of working are embedded within local cultural contexts that create norms around the very idea of what science is. The ideas of "thought styles" and "epistemic cultures" are clearly related. Both speak to the styles of reasoning, representation, evidence collection, and theory production that characterize different scientific practices, although where Fleck's idea of "thought style" places its emphasis on bodies of reason, Knorr Cetina's underscores the importance of the cultural groups who embody these ways of approaching problems. 1 That is, we need not only to pay attention to the styles of thinking, reasoning, and experimenting that reflect different ways of understanding the empirical and theoretical foundations of interaction design but also to recognize too that these are embedded in different professional and disciplinary communities. This is both the challenge and the value of interdisciplinary encounter in a broad-based domain like HCI; that different communities run the risk of speaking past each other due to different epistemological commitments but also that the value of interdisciplinary engagements is precisely the way in which they have the potential to destabilize the conceptual apparatus that limits us.
I am delighted to see the sorts of deep conceptual examination that Janlert and Stolterman offer. I look forward to the conversation that it provokes.
